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R3-86 (ISA) facility The ISA facility is located to the West of the Canister Storage Building (CSB) and provides for the interim storage of non-defense production reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) The SNF will be housed in three separate dry cask storage systems The ISA facility includes concrete storage pads to support the dry cask storage systems and is enclosed within perimeter fencing
INTRODUCTION
Background
The ISA will be use to store SNF from the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF), the 324 Building and the Neutron Radiography Facility (NRF) Each facility has a different dry cask storage system The three dry cask storage systems being placed at the 200 Area ISA are the Interim Storage Cask (ISC), which is used for the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) SNF, the NAC-I cask housed within International Standards Organization (ISO) containers used for the 324 SNF and the Rad-VaultTM which is used to store Test
Reactor and Isotope Production General Atomics (TRIGA") casks and U S Department of Transportation (DOT)-GM containers filled with SNF from the NRF The dry cask storage systems are designed for a life of 40 years lntenm storage is intended at the ISA until the materials are shipped to a disposal facility
The ISCs, NAC-1 casks, Rad-VaultTM and NRF TRIGAm casks have been analyzed to meet the radioactive material release criteria of Title I O , Code of Federal Regulations ( I O CFR) Section 71 51(a)(2) from exposure to the 10 CFR Section 71 73(c)(4) thermal exposure conditions
2 Purpose
This FHA addresses the potential fire hazards associated with the ISA facility in accordance with the requirements of DOE Order 5480 7A It is intended to assess the risk from fire to ensure there are no undue fire hazards to site personnel and the public and to ensure property damage potential from fire is within acceptable limits This FHA will be in the form of a graded approach commensurate with the complexity of the structure or area and the associated tire hazards
The FHA evaluates the ISA facility to ascertain whether the objectives of DOE Order 5480 7A, Fire Protection are met These objectives are as follows Minimize the potential for the occurrence of a fire Ensure that the fire does not cause an on-site of off-site release of radiological and other hazardous material that will threaten public health and safety or the environment Ensure that an acceptable degree of life safety to DOE and contractor personnel I The ISC was analyzed by General Atomic to the transient fire accident criteria for transportation as defined above (GA 1995) Following the 30 minutes of exposure to the fire, the ambient environment returns to normal temperature, but no artificial cooling is assumed For this short-term thermal loading to the ISC, it was determined that the amount of concrete remaining below the ACI-349 accident condition limit of 177'C (350'F) was more than adequate to meet the shielding criteria of 1 remlhour at 1 meter Additionally, the tire produced negligible increase in stress and resulted in acceptable temperatures of the all-metal components of the confinement boundary The ISC radioacitve payload was determined to be unaffected following exposure to the1 0 CFR 71 73 (c)(4) thermal exposure 3 2 2 NAC-1 Cask 3 2 2 1 I S 0 containers are used to house NAC-1 casks that contain the commercial light water reactor (LWR) SNF currently at the 324 Building in the Hanford Site 300 Area Within each NAC-1 cask will be an inner container, which will provide confinement for the LWR SNF Each inner container will hold either an individual assembly or consolidated rods The NAC-1 cask is a metal cask, which provides structural strength and shielding for the inner canister Each NAC-1 cask is approximated by a right circular cylinder 214 inches long, which has a maximum diameter of 50 inches Loaded gross weight of the cask is approximately 49,000 pounds Each NAC-I cask is placed in an IS0 container which provides weather protection Each I S 0 container footprint is 8 feet by 20 feet Six I S 0 containers will be initially stored at the 200 Area ISA 3 2 2 2 Compliance with CFR Cntena
The NAC-I cask was previously analyzed for the transportation fire scenario in the NAC-1 safety analysis report (SAR) (NAC 1990 and TRI 1996) for a 750 watt internal thermal load, which is greater than the thermal load of the inventory to be stored The analysis demonstrated the NAC-I cask maintains its integrity and meets the IOCFR Section 71 51(a)(2) limits during the IOCFR Section 71 73(c)(4) fire conditions Exposure temperatures will not cause cavity and seal temperatures or pressure design limits to be exceeded Additionally, the shielding is expected to be maintained at an acceptable level There would be no loss of confinement during the fire and the canister will retain its integrity to protect the SNF The Rad-VaultTM was analyzed and determined to meet the IOCFR Section 71 51(a)(2) radioactive material release criteria The TRlGA@fuel cladding emperature limit of 149°C (302OF) would not be exceeded although the design specification for concrete temperature exposure for the Rad-VaultTm could be exceeded for a short period from exposure to the fire conditions It has been determined no radiological release would result from exposure of the RadVaultTM to the 1 OCFR Section 71 73(c)(4) fire Exposure temperatures will not cause cavity and seal temperatures or pressure design limits to be exceeded The NRF TRIGA' casks and DOT-GM containers will be delivered to the 200 Area ISA and placed into the Rad-VaultTM
Compliance with CFR Cntena Equipment operated at the 200 Area ISA facility includes the tractor/transporter used for individual on-site transfer of an ISC, ISO, or Rad-VaultTM container with their respective payloads The transporter has access to locations near the storage area so that an onsite crawler-crane can make the lift directly from the transporter to the storage location Access-ways allow the crane to be positioned without having to drive onto or over the concrete pads Plywood, commonly used to protect concrete from vehicular traffic, is not required for normal operations in the 200 Area ISA Therefore plywood used for this purpose will not contribute to the combustible loading within the ISA The cranes that may be used in the ISA are limited to the 250 ton Manatowac 4600 or the 150 ton Manatowac 4100 The transporter and crane will be operated during initial placement of the dry cask storage systems, future new receipts such as the TRIGA@SNF from the 200 West Area, and future off-loading for transfer to the proposed National Repository The crane will be used for regular periodic inspections and maintenance on the lSCs and TRIGA@ casks Portable fire extinguishers will not be provided at the ISA The ISA will be routinely inspected to ensure it is kept free of debris and natural vegetation The ISA will also be checked for accumulations of combustibles following windstorms The perimeter fence is expected to keep most of the transient debris away from the dry cask storage systems Housekeeping procedures will be used for the routine inspections and will require notification for removal of accumulated combustibles when necessary
There are no ignition sources or inherent fire hazards associated with the ISCs, RadVaultTM and NRF TRlGA@ casks, or NAC-1 casks and IS0 containers However diesel fuel and/or gasoline powered vehicles are needed to facilitate movement of the ISCs, NRF TRIGAm casks and DOT-GM container, and NAC-1 casks and IS0 containers into, out of and within the ISA facility A transporter tractor truck carrying up to 200 gallons of fuel oil will be used to move the casks into and out of the ISA facility A crane carrying up to 100 gallons of fuel oil will be used to move the casks to and from the truck and manipulate them inside the ISA facility It is also anticipated that a tanker ttuck carrying up to 2500 gallons of gasoline and 500 gallons of fuel oil will be needed periodically to The 10 CFR 71 51 release criteria limit escape of =Kr to 10,000 wries in one week
The CFR also limits the escape of other radioactive material to less than A2 amount in one week, and limits external radiation dose rate to one rem per hour at one meter from the external surface of the package
The I OCFR Section 71 73(c)(4) thermal conditions are adopted from the requirements established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the thermal test for demonstrating the ability of the specimen being transported to withstand accident conditions The approaches are specified in the IAEA Safety Standards, Safety Series The test calls for fully engulfed exposure of the whole specimen for a period of 30 minutes to a hydrocarbon fuellair fire that provides an average emmisivity coefficient of at least 0 9, with an average flame temperature of at least 80O0C The practical test method described in Safety Series No 37 has the test specimen positioned I meter above the surface of the liquid fuel source pool, which extends between I and 3 meters beyond the edges of the specimen All sides of the specimen must be exposed to a luminous flame not less than 0 7 meter and not more than 3 meters thick The fuel is specified to be a distillate of petroleum with a distillation end point of 330% maximum and an open cup flash point of 46OC minimum and a gross heating value of between 46 and 49 megajoute/kilogram This covers most hydrocarbons derived from petroleum with a density of less than 820 kg/m3, e g kerosene and JP4-type fuels 5 3 Fire Hazards
The purpose for the evaluation of the fire scenarios identified in this FHA is to determine if the scenarios are bounded by the 10 CFR 71 73 analysis Those scenarios which are bounded will require no controls either engineered or administrative Those Scenarios which are not bounded will require engineered or administrative controls to reduce the severity of the accident or eliminate the hazard
The worst case fire for any of the dry cask storage systems is one that fully engulfs the cask The most likely way for this to occur would be a liquid fuel spill underneath the cask that is somehow ignited Fires involving solid materials could result in exposure to the cask but full engulfment is unlikely at the heat flux required by the 10 CFR71 73
Summary of CFR Cntena criteria Liquid fuels such as fuel oil and gasoline have heats of combustion up to twice those of most types of wood The contribution of combustible materials such as dimensional lumber, plywood, etc in combination with a liquid fuel are not likely to have a significant impact to the severity of a fire engulfing a cask However, this scenario was evaluated in section 5 4 2
The liquid fuel fire is the most likely and potentially the most significant fire event for the ISA facility Liquid fuel leaking from the transporter truck, the crane or the fuel truck could result in a fire that engulfs any one of the dry cask storage systems Fuel leaks could be either of two ways A catastrophic failure of a fuel tank would cause all the fuel to leak almost instantaneously However, the most conservative and likely scenario would be a constant leakage rate from one of the vehicles The worst case scenario would be that in which the leakage rate of fuel from the vehicle was equal to the burn rate of the fuel pool fire at the required pool diameter for a particular item as established in 10 CFR 71 73
The footprints of the three dry cask storage systems are as follows ISC -7 foot (2 13 m) diameter (38 4 ft2 The ISC footprint encompasses the smallest area This will result in the smallest burn rate and therefore the smallest leakage rate that is required to produce the minimum pool diameter for compliance with the 10 CFR 71 73 test criteria With the leakage rate equal to the burn rate for a period of 30 minutes, the smallest quantity of fuel needed to produce a fire equivalent to the 10 CFR 71 73 fire can be determined If the quantity of fuel at the ISA facility is limited to this amount, a fuel fire involving any of the dry cask storage systems will not be more severe than the 10 CFR 71 73 thermal analysis test This quantity of fuel will be enough to engulf the ISC container per the 10 CFR 71 73 criteria but will not be enough to engulf the IS0 Container or the Rad-Vaultm cask systems per the I O CFR 71 73 cntena
The burn rate or mass loss rate of the fuel oil must be known for the chosen diameter in order to determine how much fuel will burn in 30 minutes The fuel mass loss rate, M , has been shown by [Babrauskas, 19931 to The possibility exists that combustible materials, plywood for example, in combination with fuel oil could be involved in fire within the cask boundanes established by the 10 CFR 71 73 thermal analysis criteria Fuel oil has a higher heat of combustion than ordinary combustibles such as wood, paper, cloth, etc and most plastics Therefore, if the bum time of the plywood is minimized to not more than 30 minutes, then the impact of the burning plywood will be bounded by the liquid fuel fire This analysis will determine how many stacked sheets of plywood will produce a burn time of 30 minutes or less Two, stacked, % sheets of plywood laying flat are analyzed for bum time as follows Average burn rate for wood, M" = 2 57E -2 lb/m2s
Heat of Combustion for wood, h, = 8000 BTUllb Area, A = 4n x 8 ft = 32 n2 = 3 m2
Heat Release Rate, q" = (M)(hJ(A) = (2 86E -2 Ib/m2s)(8000BTU/lb)(3 m2) = 686 BTUlS
The total heat produced by one sheet of plywood IS as follows The total time, t, to burn one sheet under ideal conditions is t = (560,000 BTUlsheet)l686 BTUls) = 816 slsheet
The time to burn both sheets is t = 816 slsheet (2 sheets) = 1632 s = 27 minutes
The limit on the number of sheets plywood that can be stacked is two An equal or lesser amount of combustible material equivalent to that of two sheets of plywood over a 32 ft2 is also permitted The total number of sheets of plywood on each storage pad is not limited as long as they are stacked no more than two sheets high 5 4 3 FuelTruck
The fuel truck could be carrying up to 2500 gallons of gasoline and 500 gallons of fuel oil This quantity of fuel could potentially subject the dry cask storage systems to a fire that is outside the bounds of the 10 CFR 71 73 fire test critena
The "principles" of NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible bquids Code, 1996 edition, were used to establish that the separation distances afforded by keeping the fuel truck outside the perimeter fencing at all times are adequate to protect the dry cask storage systems from an exposure fire due to spilled fuel from the fuel truck. Section 2-3 4 2 of NFPA 30 describes the spill control protection method of remote impounding Remote impounding is a method in which spilled liquid is routed or drained to a remote area
The Flammable and Combustible bquids Codes Handbook states in the commentary for this section that the impounding area must be located so that, if the spill ignites, the fire will not seriously damage other tanks or adjoining property This distance is established in Section 2-3 4 2 (d) which states in part, "The confines of the impounding area shall be located so that, when filled to capacity, the liquid level will not be closer than 50 ft (15 m) from any property line that is or can be built upon, or from any tank "
The location of ISA perimeter fencing is shown in Figure 1 Access to the ISA is from a paved road along the full length of the North side The paving continues the length of the east side of the ISA and for approximately 200 feet along the south side from the east No paved areas are planned for the remainder of the south side of the ISA or the west side The minimum distance from the perimeter fencing to the nearest edge of a concrete storage pad is on the East side of the ISA This distance is approximately 80 feet The ground on the East side of the ISA slopes away from the storage pad and towards the perimeter fencing Fuel spilled on the eastern side of the ISA would remain outside the perimeter fencing The perimeter fencing on both the north and south sides of the ISA is approximately I 1 0 feet to the nearest edge of a concrete storage pad The perimeter fencing on the west side is located approximately 140 feet from the nearest edge of a concrete storage pad The ground on the north, south and west sides of the ISA will be contoured to a slope of approximately 2% towards the concrete storage pads The slope will begin approximately at the perimeter fencing boundary A fuel spill outside the perimeter fencing on the either the north, south or west sides of the ISA will not flow towards the concrete storage pads unless the fuel gets inside the perimeter fencing This could occur due to a large spill in a short amount of time while the truck was parked next to the perimeter fencing or from a pressurized spray leak directed inside the perimeter fencing All ground inside the perimeter fencing with the exception of the concrete pads will be covered with gravel The graveled surface will tend to impede the flow of liquid spills and result in more fuel being absorbed into the ground Although a specific remote impounding area has not been established for the fuel truck, the increased separation distances and physical configuration of the area between the dry cask storage systems and the fuel truck are considered to meet the intent of NFPA 30 for adequate exposure protection
4 4 Conclusion
Limiting the diesel fuel to 304 gallons within the ISA fenced area will ensure that the criteria established by the 10 CFR 71 73 thermal test are not exceeded for any of the dry cask storage systems The tractor and crane carry a combined maximum of 300 gallons of diesel fuel, therefore there are no fuel restrictions regarding the use of these vehicles in proximity to any of the dry cask storage systems The impact to any of the dry cask systems is unknown if exposed to a fire that exceeds the 10 CFR 71 73 thermal test criteria Therefore, the fuel truck must remain outside the ISA perimeter fencing at all times Transporter tractor truck and crane refueling operations must take place outside the perimeter fencing The separation distances created between the fuel truck and the dry cask storage system locations by requiring the fuel truck to remain outside the perimeter fencing meet the intent of NFPA 30 for property protection and provide assurance that the dry cask storage systems will not be subjected to a fuel fire that exceeds the 10 CFR 71 73 criteria from a fuel truck fuel spill Plywood cannot subject the dry cask storage systems to a fire that exceeds the 10 CFR 71 73 thermal test criteria provided it is not stacked more than two sheets high and no additional combustibles are placed on the plywood
The fuel package size of other ordinary combustibles used on the ISA facility should be limited to the equivalent of two stacked s/4" sheets of plywood over a 32 f12 area limited fire fuel loading If any of the dry cask storage systems is ever exposed to a fire, it will be inspected and will require recertification from a qualified testing agency vegetation is not considered an event that will threaten the integrity of the dry cask storage systems However, the accumulation of natural vegetation in and around the ISA facility still represents a hazard that should be addressed
0 RECOMMENDATIONS
The fuel truck is not permitted inside the ISA perimeter fencing Refueling operations involving the transporter tractor truck, the crane and any other vehicles must take place outside the ISA perimeter fencing
Develop an administrative procedure or other appropnate documented method to prohibit the storage of all combustible materials within the ISAfacility and control the quantity, use, cleanup and removal of combustible materials needed for maintenance and operational purposes, including plywood The administrative procedure should also address routine housekeeping within the ISA facility and a means to control natural vegetation, which could include removal andlor herbicide spraying Provide a means to ensure at least one access gate on each end of the ISA facility (2 total), are unlocked when the facility is occupied in order to facilitate egress in the event of an emergency Some form of two-way communication should be in place during activities inside the ISA facility A prefire plan must be developed by the HFD prior to any dry cask storage systems being placed in the ISA
